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P

opulation-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) has become the American
Army’s new way of war. The principles and ideas that emerged out of
the Army’s counterinsurgency field manual (FM), FM 3-24, published in
late 2006, have become transcendent. The field manual has moved beyond
simple Army doctrine for countering insurgencies to become the defining
characteristic of the Army’s new way of war. In the American Army today,
everyone is a counterinsurgent. It is easy to find examples of FM 3-24’s
permeating effect in other Army doctrinal manuals such as FM 3-0, Operations, and FM 3-07, Stability Operations. Lieutenant General William B.
Caldwell, IV, the American Army general charged with writing the Army’s
doctrine, recently stated:
The future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by armies on
battlefields devoid of population; instead, the course of conflict will be decided by forces operating among the people of the world. Here, the margin
of victory will be measured in far different terms than the wars of our past.
The allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters
of success.1

The idea of populations as the prize in war, that they are the focus, is
drawn directly from the pages of FM 3-24.2
In a sense, population-centric counterinsurgency has perverted a
better way of American war which has primarily been one of improvisation
and practicality. Over the course of American history there have been strategic shifts in terms of the threats and enemies that the United States had
faced. With each of these shifts came a different approach, or way, to fighting wars or preparing for them in peacetime. For example, in the American
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Civil War, General Ulysses S. Grant carried out a strategy of exhausting
the southern armies through large-scale combat. A quarter of a century later in the Philippines, the American Army improvised and adapted to fight
and ultimately defeat an insurgency against the US colonial government.
As historian Brian Linn has shown in criticism of Russell Weigley’s classic The American Way of War, the US military’s approach has not been an
ideological one of only wanting to fight wars consisting of big battles. A
close reading of Linn’s work shows that the true American way of war has
been one of adaptation and flexibility, and not a rigid ideological attachment to seeking out the next Napoleonic battle of Austerlitz.3
Regrettably, the American Army’s new way of war, otherwise called
population-centric counterinsurgency, has become the only operational tool
in the Army’s repertoire to deal with problems of insurgency and instability
throughout the world. Population-centric COIN may be a reasonable operational method to use in certain circumstances, but it is not a strategy. There
are flaws and limitations that need to be exposed and considered.
A Military Methodology
Population-centric counterinsurgency is a military operation, a method, nothing more and nothing less. Its ideas and rules of tactics and operations should be familiar to anyone who has studied or thought about various
approaches to COIN. They are:
• Populations are always the focus, the center of gravity, and they
have to be protected.
• The enemy insurgent as a rule cannot be as important or given
the same level of emphasis as the population.
• Population-centric COIN requires patience on the part of the
American people.
• It demands a certain tactical approach of dispersion into small
outposts to live amongst the people to win their hearts and minds; this has
become the concept of clear, hold, and build.
• Population-centric counterinsurgency equals nation-building, and
it requires a major investment in time to be successful.
• Its historical model of success is the British in Malaya.

Colonel Gian P. Gentile is director of the Military History Program at the US Military Academy. In 2006, he commanded a cavalry squadron in West Baghdad. He holds a
Ph.D. in history from Stanford University.



Parameters

• Its supreme historical failure is the United States’ involvement
in Vietnam.
• Its current narrative is that the techniques of population-centric
counterinsurgency practiced by several additional combat brigades as part of
the Surge of forces in Iraq produced success after February 2007.
• Its historical “how-to” text is Counterinsurgency Warfare by a
French Army officer who fought in Algeria, David Galula.
• Its current set of rules are prescribed in FM 3-24. As the rules dictate, an Army unit must learn and adapt to improved population-centric tactics and operations; the unit cannot learn and adapt other methods in place of
population-centric counterinsurgency.
Good strategy, however, demands the consideration of alternatives,
yet the American Army’s fixation on population-centric COIN precludes
choice. We may have become adept at appearing to apply Galula’s principles in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we are not good strategists. Strategy
is about choice, options, and the wisest use of resources in war to achieve
policy objectives. Yet in the American Army’s new way of war, tactics—
that is, the carrying out of the “way”—have utterly eclipsed strategy.
Nation-building using population-centric COIN as its centerpiece
should be viewed as an operation. It should not be viewed as strategy, or
even policy for that matter. But what is occurring now in Afghanistan, for
example, at least for the American Army, is a “strategy of tactics.” If strategy calls for nation-building as an operational method to achieve policy objectives, and it is resourced correctly, then the population-centric approach
might make sense. But because the United States has “principilized” population-centric COIN into the only way of doing any kind of counterinsurgency, it dictates strategy.
Tactical Orientation
Ironically, the new approach has inverted political scientist Andrew
Krepinevich’s damning criticism of the American Army in his hugely influential but deeply flawed 1986 book, The Army in Vietnam. Krepinevich’s strategy of tactics argument for Vietnam was that the American Army
was so conventionally minded and hidebound that it was unable to see
a better way of population-centric COIN.4 Now the American Army has
done the inverse. The Army is so tactically oriented toward populationcentric counterinsurgency that it cannot think of doing anything else. General Stanley McChrystal’s recently released command guidance to forces
in Afghanistan employs all of the dictums of population-centric counterinsurgency and confirms this strategy of tactics. His statement that success in
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Afghanistan will not be determined by the number of enemy killed but by
the “shielding” of the civilian population could have easily come out of the
pages of FM 3-24, or commander’s talking points during the Iraq Surge.5
These population-centric COIN principles have been turned into
immutable rules that are dictating strategy in Afghanistan and having
a powerful shaping effect on reorganizing the American Army. A few
months ago, when asked about the way ahead for the American military
in Afghanistan and how Iraq was comparable to Afghanistan, General
David Petraeus acknowledged that the two were very different. But the
thing to remember, according to General Petraeus, was that the principles of COIN that the Army has learned in Iraq over the past couple of
years are applicable to Afghanistan.6
Those principles belong to the population-centric COIN methodology. If we accept that the principles are applicable, then we have already
chosen the way ahead in Afghanistan, which is population-centric nationbuilding requiring large numbers of American ground combat forces, dispersed into the local population in an effort to win their hearts and minds
away from the insurgent enemy, and to eventually build a nation.
It is a recipe for a long-term American combat presence in the
world’s troubled spots. At present in the American Army there does not
seem to be any alternatives. The inability to realistically consider alternatives reveals that the Army has become dogmatic, bound like a Gordian
knot to the methods of population-centric counterinsurgency as the sole solution in Afghanistan and, potentially, in any other part of the world where
instability and insurgencies are brewing.7
How did this happen? How did we get to a point where the American Army has developed a mentality, a worldview, a zeitgeist, of population-centric counterinsurgency, reflecting the American Army’s new way
of war? The genesis for all of this was the US Army’s experience in Vietnam. The American Army lost that war, as Krepinevich argued, because
under General William Westmoreland it tried to fight World War II all over
again, a conventional war. The American Army did not understand population-centric COIN, could only think in terms of conventional warfare, and
therefore lost, according to Krepinevich and others. Derivatives of this argument by author Lewis Sorley in his book A Better War say there was a
radical change between General Westmoreland and his successor, General
Creighton Abrams, and that Abrams redirected the American Army’s strategy and could have won if the American people and their policymakers
had not lost their will.8
The British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya is viewed in a
similar way. As the standard understanding goes, just as with the radical
change between Westmoreland and Abrams, so too in Malaya there was
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a substantial shift in strategy between Generals Harold Briggs and Gerald Templer with their respective search-and-destroy and hearts-and-minds
campaigns. Briggs, according to the stock explanations, focused too much
on large-unit, conventional operations using search-and-destroy techniques
trying to kill enemy insurgents, or what later commentators referred to as
the enemy-centric approach. But it was Briggs’s replacement, Sir Gerald
Templer, who understood the importance of winning the hearts and minds
of the population and shifted strategy to the classic population-centric counterinsurgency approach utilizing techniques designed to persuade the population to support the government and reject the insurgents.9
These historical interpretations have been seriously challenged and
in a number of instances overturned by current historical scholarship. Regarding Vietnam, American scholars such as Andrew Birtle and Dale
Andrade have shown that there was not a radical change between Westmoreland and Abrams, and that Westmoreland’s strategy, at least in 1965
when faced with a conventional Communist threat inside South Vietnam,
made sense. With regard to the British in Malaya, new scholarship by British historian Karl Hack strongly suggests that there was more continuity
than discontinuity between Briggs and Templer and that the insurgency
was actually broken during the Briggs years, not under Templer. Briggs,
as this revisionist interpretation argues, based on newly released primary
sources, broke the back of the insurgency through the use of military force
directed against the insurgents, combined with an effective population resettlement program that took away the insurgents’ base of support.10
COIN in Iraq
From the history of the Vietnam War, fast forward to the Iraq War
and the beginning of the Surge of forces in February 2007. At that time
and even in the year before, one began to hear arguments that the reason
things were going so badly in Iraq was because the American Army up to
the point when the Surge was initiated did not fully understand how to execute COIN, and in the early years of the conflict was making the same
mistakes it did in Vietnam and that the British initially made in Malaya. The
primary mistake, as this standard explanation goes, was that the American
Army was trying to fight a war of big battles in the Sunni triangle instead
of using the proper approach—to apply Galula and win hearts and minds.11
In short, the conventionally minded American Army did not prepare for COIN before the war, did not understand how to execute it once
the war started (except for a few exceptional units such as the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in Talafar, or 1st
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Brigade of the 1st Armored Division in Ramadi), and this lack of knowledge, experience, and training caused things to turn out so badly. But then
things quickly turned around in February 2007 with the Surge of forces
armed with a new counterinsurgency manual called FM 3-24. Under inspired new leadership the American Army started doing counterinsurgency correctly.12 Best-known of the books that have espoused this narrative are
Thomas Ricks’s Fiasco and The Gamble, Linda Robinson’s Tell Me How
This Ends, and Kimberly Kagan’s The Surge: A Military History.13
The triumph narrative associated with the Surge can best be summarized as follows. Prior to the Surge, the conventionally minded Army
under General George Casey, when he was commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, had allowed the insurgency to grow and by the end of 2006
had withdrawn from the rural regions and hunkered down on Forward Operating Bases while the Iraq civil war raged. But with the Surge, the new
commander, General David Petraeus, armed his army with the new COIN
doctrine in the form of FM 3-24 and deployed American combat forces
into major population areas. Once in these locations, the US Army in Iraq
began executing population-centric COIN correctly; they were able to secure the population, win the hearts and minds, and from this new position
of power the deals cut with the Sons of Iraq, Moqtada al Sadr’s retreat,
and all the other successes flowed from the population-centric actions of
the American Army.14
Consider these historical analogies that appear to perfectly support
such a narrative. In Malaya, the failing Briggs to the successful Templer;
in Vietnam, the anachronistic, conventionally minded Westmoreland to
the enlightened, counterinsurgency-minded Abrams; and in Iraq, the Fulda Gap, big-battle strategy of Casey to the new way of population-centric
counterinsurgency of Petraeus. More recently in Afghanistan, the change
between General David McKiernan and General Stanley McChrystal, with
the former being cast as the general who did not necessarily comprehend
America’s new way of war and was viewed as being a member of the “old
school” Army.15
Quite possibly, the will of the Sunni insurgency broke long before the Surge went into full effect in the summer of 2007. A combination of brutal attacks by Shia militia in conjunction with the actions of the
Iraqi Shia government and the continuing persecution by al Qaeda against
the Sunni community convinced the insurgents that they could no longer
counter all these forces and it was to their advantage to cut a deal with the
Americans. To be sure, the reduction in violence that began in the summer
of 2007 in Iraq had multiple causes, and the Surge did contribute. But to
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think that the reduction of violence was primarily the result of American
military action is hubris run amuck.16
Points of Criticism
This combined Malaya, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan War narrative has turned the American Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine outlined in FM 3-24 into an oracle, a cipher that unlocks the keys to success
in any counterinsurgency as long as its precepts, principles, and rules are
adhered to. But there are points of criticism to the new doctrine that need
to be seriously considered. First, it provides for only one way to counter
insurgencies and deal with the world’s instabilities, and that way is population-centric counterinsurgency. The manual offers no other alternatives, no
other strategies or methodologies. There is a short five-line paragraph in
Chapter 5 that considers more limited options. That short paragraph should
have been turned into half of the manual.
Second, history has shown that insurgencies can be defeated by
means other than the population-centric approach. Consider the recent defeat of the Tamil Tigers by the Sri Lankan military. Or consider what actually broke the back of the Malayan insurgency in the early 1950s, which
was not so much the hearts-and-minds persuasion of Templer but the
hard-handed use of military force against civilians, combined with a major resettlement program. FM 3-24 actually serves as a restatement of the
counter-Maoist approach to insurgencies that military officers such as Galula and Sir Robert Thompson developed in the 1950s and 1960s.17 The
end result is a counterinsurgency doctrine that has become a guiding set of
operational principles for today’s American Army and greater defense establishment. A doctrine based on lessons learned while combating the FLN
insurgents in Algeria, Malaya Communist insurgents, and other Communist-inspired insurgencies some 50 years ago.
The American Army has become ahistorical in the manner in which
it thinks about counterinsurgency, meaning it has difficulty thinking in
a historical context. In a sense, it is as if the world of counterinsurgency
warfare began suddenly around 1945 with the end of World War II and
the rise of the Cold War, along with the numerous people’s wars inspired
by nationalism and communism. The term itself “counterinsurgency” is so
heavily loaded with historical context, assumptions, myths, and absurdities
that it has become almost meaningless. A set of case studies of counterinsurgency operations has been extracted from their historical context and
turned into a large historical trope used to define and judge any small war,
imperial war, or insurgency.18
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What is needed to correct this fallacy is for this ahistorical view of
counterinsurgency warfare to be integrated back to its historical context
and combined with a much longer view of small-war history dating to the
early 1800s.19 Most worrisome for those concerned with the future of the
American Army is that there has not been a wide-ranging debate over the
efficacy and utility of this new way of war. Between 1976 and 1982, more
than 110 published articles appeared in the professional journal, Military
Review, fundamentally challenging the Army’s doctrine at the time, the
Active Defense. There has been no similar debate following the publication of FM 3-24 almost three years ago. What has appeared is a series of
articles touting the triumph of the Surge, a narrative that has steamrolled
the American Army into accepting this new way of war.
Some strategists say that if the United States is going to conduct
nation-building, then the population-centric approach is the best. That
may be true, but this article’s thesis is that because this new way of war
has become so dominant, it precludes America’s Army from thinking in
other more limited ways for dealing with instability and insurgencies.
This intellectual straightjacket of population-centric counterinsurgency has had other deleterious effects on the Army. It has pushed America’s Army and other parts of the American defense establishment into
fanciful thinking. The authors of FM 3-24 declare that counterinsurgency is the graduate level of warfare. Implicit in this statement is that conventional war is the undergraduate level. A respected counterinsurgency
professional in the US Army, Colonel Robert Cassidy, said in a widely
cited 2004 essay that conducting counterinsurgency warfare was “more
difficult” than conventional war. Another counterinsurgency expert, David Ucko, in a recent book on what he calls the “new counterinsurgency
era,” argues that COIN with all of its associated political and economic
tasks is “far more demanding” than the relatively simple process of “locating and striking targets.” 20
In fact, COIN is arguably less complex precisely because it is
less “kinetic.” There is very little room for commander or soldier error
in high- intensity combat. People are killed immediately, and sometimes
many of them. COIN is executed at a slower pace and, thus, can be more
forgiving. People get killed, yes, but far fewer than in fighting at the higher end of the conflict spectrum; and more importantly in COIN there is a
great deal more time to assess, judge, and decide.
Something Revolutionary?
Counterinsurgency experts in the American defense establishment
have gone to great lengths to turn their new way of war into something rev12

Parameters

olutionary, something radically different from the past, something more
complex and qualitatively more difficult than what came before.21 The Prussian theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz, said that “everything in war is
very simple . . . but the simplest thing is difficult.” To be fair, it is not that
COIN or conventional warfare is the harder or easier. All warfare is demanding and difficult, that is why it is called war. In the 1920s, the German Army, as it thought its way through the lessons of the First World
War, understood this point. Under the leadership of the brilliant German
General Hans von Seeckt, they believed that the nature of war was essentially unchanging even if the means, machines, and milieu of it do change.
Von Seeckt and his officers rejected what they referred to as any “schema”
for war that tried to reduce its nature to a list of principles and rules.22
The COIN experts seem to believe that they are “young Turks”
who have figured out the true political nature of war compared to the old,
conventionally minded American military leaders who did not care about
such things and only wanted to focus on tactics. Since population-centric
COIN involves political activities at low levels such as platoons, companies, and battalions (for example, establishing village governing councils,
etc.), its proponents then assume that the tactical activities that involve
politics in the execution of COIN mean that those executing this doctrine
understand the political nature of war writ large.23 But in theory, there is
nothing more political in a platoon leader in the Korengal Valley talking
to a sheik about local governance then there was of a rifle platoon leader
storming the beach at Normandy. Again, to cite the old Prussian, “War in
all of its action and forms is fundamentally a political act.”
With the new American way of war as population-centric counterinsurgency, the Army has lost track of what has happened to its conventional warfighting skills. In 2008, three US Army colonels, all former
combat brigade commanders in Iraq, told Army Chief of Staff General
George Casey that after seven years of conducting almost nothing but population-centric counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
Army’s field artillery branch had lost its ability to fight and had become a
“dead branch walking.” Others have also expressed concern over the atrophying of core fighting competencies. Commenting on the widely read
Small Wars Journal blog, Major Ike Sallee, an infantry officer with two
combat tours in Iraq, stated:
The Army, if we want to remain a profession, is best served in adhering to
core values, principles, and capabilities. If the core is strong . . . then we
are able to transfer capability to other methods. But if we focus on methods (area-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures) at the expense of
core capabilities (offensive, defensive, protection, battle drills, marksman-
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ship, physical fitness) we will be chasing our tails and may find ourselves
lacking identity and relevance . . . . If forced to prioritize (inevitable for the
foreseeable future)—focus on core capabilities . . . what our Army can do
exclusively for our Nation. If we are thrown into a condition requiring counterinsurgency tactics, we will be able to adapt because of our well-trained
competencies.

The essential point and concern expressed by Major Sallee is that
an army’s core capability is to fight at every level of command. If it can
do that, it can do almost anything.24 This is not an argument to stop the focus on COIN operations, since they are the missions the Army has been
assigned by the nation’s political leaders. The critique of population-centric COIN is a call for the American Army to honestly look at itself and the
risks that it is taking.
There are indeed risks. History and more recent events show what
happens when armies trained and organized for counterinsurgencies and
small wars have to rapidly adapt to missions at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. The French Army’s failure in the Franco-Prussian War of
1871 was partly due to the influence from colonial warfare, as was the
British Army’s experience in the early months of the Second Boer War.
The Israeli Defense Forces’ recent experience in Lebanon is another good example. There were many reasons for its failure, but one of
them, as validated by scholars and analysts, is that its army had done almost nothing but COIN in the Palestinian territories, and its ability to fight
against a strident enemy had atrophied. During the past few months a number of studies have been published on Israel’s 2008 operations in Gaza.
What these reports show is that the Israeli military, especially its army, realized what had happened to them in Lebanon and took the intervening
two years to get back to the basics of war fighting; critical competencies
such as synchronizing fire, maneuver, and intelligence at all levels of command against a hostile force.25 The American Army would do well to pay
attention to what the Israeli army has undergone in the past two years.
The COIN zeitgeist has convinced many observers that conventionally trained and minded armies cannot do counterinsurgency warfare. This
belief is not supported by history. Examples of success are the American
Army in the Philippines, the British Army in Malaya, and the US Army
in Vietnam and moreover in Iraq starting in 2003, not 2007.26 It is dangerous, however, to think that this principle can operate in reverse, as the example of the Israelis in Lebanon demonstrates. Imagine how well the drive
on Baghdad would have gone in 2003 if the American Army had spent the
majority of its training time in the years prior learning to talk to sheiks, rebuild schools, or conduct negotiations.
14
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But the most damaging consequence to the American Army from
the new zeitgeist of COIN is that it has taken the Army’s focus off of strategy. Currently, US military strategy is really nothing more than a bunch of
COIN principles, massaged into catchy commander’s talking points for the
media, emphasizing winning the hearts and minds and shielding civilians.
The result is a strategy of tactics and principles.
Conclusion
Instead of American Army officers reading the so-called COIN
classic texts of Galula, Thompson, Kitson, and Nagl, they should be reading the history of the British Empire in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It is in this period that if they did nothing else right the British Army
and government did understand the value of strategy. They understood the
essence of linking means to ends. In other words, they did not see military
operations as ends in themselves but instead as a means to achieve policy
objectives. And they realized that there were costs that had to be paid.27
The new American way of war has eclipsed the execution of sound
strategy, producing never-ending campaigns of nation-building and attempts
to change entire societies in places like Afghanistan. One can only guess at
the next spot on the globe for this kind of crusade.28 Former Army officer
and writer Craig Mullaney, who recently penned a book-portrait of himself
and what he learned in combat, said that the “Achilles’ heel for Americans
is our lack of patience.” But perhaps not; perhaps America’s lack of patience in wars like Iraq and Afghanistan should be seen as a virtue in that
it could act as a mechanism to force the US military to execute strategy in
a more efficient and successful manner. Doing strategy better would leverage the American Army out of its self-inflicted box of counterinsurgency
tactics and methodologies into a more open assessment of alternatives to
current military actions in Afghanistan.
The new American way of war commits the US military to campaigns of counterinsurgency and nation-building in the world’s troubled
spots. In essence it is total war—how else can one understand it any differently when COIN experts talk about American power “changing entire
societies”—but it is a total war without the commensurate total support
of will and resources from the American people. This strategic mismatch
might prove catastrophic in the years ahead if the United States cannot figure out how to align means with ends in a successful strategy. The new
American way of war perverts and thus prevents us from doing so.
The ancient Chinese philosopher of war Sun Tzu had this to say
about the conduct of war and implicitly about its nature:
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Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory . . . . Tactics without
strategy is the noise before defeat . . . . There is no instance of a nation benefitting from prolonged warfare . . . . Speed is the essence of war.29

The new American way of war—wars amongst the people—has turned
Sun Tzu’s maxim on its head. These days it is customary to think of war
and conflict as prolonged affairs that afflict the farthest-flung precincts
of US influence, thereby demanding a long-term American military presence on the ground. We are told by the experts that this new way of war
requires time, patience, modest amounts of blood, and vast amounts of
treasure. Sun Tzu was highlighting strategy, and strategy is about choice,
options, and the wisest use of resources in war to achieve political objectives. Yet in the new way of American war, tactics have buried strategy,
and it precludes any options other than an endless and likely futile struggle
to achieve the loyalty of populations that, in the end, may be peripheral to
American interests.
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